The German tradition

No German foreign minister starts from a blank page. The Federal Republic's foreign policy was built on a small number of founding decisions, refined over seven decades and then shaken in February 2022. This page sets out that tradition, explains how responsibility is shared in Berlin, and then — in a clearly separated final section — compares Johann Wadephul's documented positions with the policy of the government he serves. Much of what follows is analysis, and it is labelled as such.

Westbindung: the founding choice

Analysis The first and most durable decision was Konrad Adenauer's. Founded in 1949, the Federal Republic chose integration with the West — Westbindung — over the alternative, debated at the time, of a neutral, reunified Germany between the blocs. West Germany joined NATO in 1955, became a founding member of the European Economic Community under the Treaties of Rome in 1957, and in January 1963 sealed reconciliation with France in the Elysée Treaty.

Westbindung was never only a security arrangement. It meant accepting that West German sovereignty would be exercised largely through multilateral institutions, and that trust from neighbours who had been invaded within living memory had to be earned rather than assumed. That idea — Germany is strongest when it is embedded — remains the starting point of nearly every German foreign-policy debate, and the CDU has always regarded itself as its custodian.

Ostpolitik and détente

Analysis The second pillar came from the SPD. As Foreign Minister from 1966 and Chancellor from 1969, Willy Brandt pursued a new Ostpolitik: treaties with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970, the Basic Treaty with East Germany in 1972, and a policy of "change through rapprochement". The CDU/CSU initially opposed much of it, but when Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982 his government largely continued the course, with Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the FDP remaining Foreign Minister.

Ostpolitik produced real results, and reunification in 1990 — secured diplomatically through the Two-plus-Four Treaty — was widely seen as its vindication. But in later decades the idea that trade and dialogue would gradually change Russia hardened into a habit. Energy ties such as the Nord Stream pipelines came to symbolise a belief that economic interdependence was itself a form of security. After February 2022 that belief was abandoned across most of the political spectrum, and the question of who had held it for too long became a political weapon.

Multilateralism and the culture of restraint

For decades, German governments of every colour preferred to act within the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Alongside this multilateralism developed a "culture of restraint" (Kultur der Zurückhaltung) in the use of military force. For the old Federal Republic, the Bundeswehr was an army for the defence of alliance territory, not for operations abroad.

Reunification changed that slowly. In 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that German armed forces could take part in operations within systems of collective security such as the UN and NATO, provided the Bundestag gave its consent. In 1999, under Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of the Greens, Germany took part in NATO's Kosovo air campaign; after 2001 came the long mission in Afghanistan. Restraint did not disappear: Germany refused to join the Iraq war in 2003, and in 2011, under Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, it abstained in the UN Security Council vote on military action in Libya.

The Zeitenwende

Fact On 27 February 2022, three days after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the Bundestag that the world had reached a Zeitenwende — a turning point. He announced a €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr and a commitment to meet NATO's 2% of GDP spending target. The special fund was anchored in the Basic Law in 2022 with the votes of the CDU/CSU opposition. In June 2023 the government adopted Germany's first National Security Strategy. In March 2025, before the new Bundestag convened, the outgoing parliament amended the Basic Law so that defence spending above 1% of GDP is exempt from the constitutional debt brake.

The Zeitenwende reversed several long-standing positions at once: Germany began delivering weapons to a country at war, ended its dependence on Russian gas and committed to sustained higher defence spending. In 2025 NATO allies, Germany included, went further and agreed at The Hague to spend 5% of GDP on defence and related infrastructure.

Israel and the idea of Staatsräson

Analysis A further constant of German foreign policy is the special relationship with Israel, rooted in responsibility for the Holocaust. Diplomatic relations were established in 1965. In a speech to the Knesset in March 2008, Chancellor Angela Merkel described Israel's security as part of Germany's Staatsräson — its reason of state. The phrase has been repeated by her successors and is widely cited in German debate, although what it requires in concrete terms, especially in wartime, has never been defined.

That ambiguity became visible during the war in Gaza. In opposition in October 2024, Wadephul said Germany "must stand firmly at Israel's side" and that blocking or delaying arms deliveries would breach a core commitment. As minister in 2025 he argued that solidarity could not be "forced" and that arms exports had to be reviewed against international humanitarian law — and was criticised by the Central Council of Jews in Germany and by CSU leader Markus Söder. The episode showed how the same tradition can be invoked to support different conclusions.

A parliamentary army

The Bundeswehr is often described as a Parlamentsarmee — a parliamentary army. Following the 1994 Constitutional Court ruling, every armed deployment abroad requires the prior consent of the Bundestag; the procedure was set out in the Parliamentary Participation Act of 2005. Mandates specify the mission, the maximum number of troops and the duration, and must be renewed, usually every year.

This gives parliament a stronger say in German foreign and security policy than in many allied countries. It also shapes careers. Wadephul spent sixteen years in the Bundestag before becoming minister, with service on the Foreign Affairs Committee and, as an alternate, on the Defence and EU Affairs Committees, and he led the German delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in the 20th Bundestag. He has kept his seat for Rendsburg-Eckernförde as minister. Our pages on the Bundestag and parliamentary work give the details.

Who decides in Berlin

Under Article 65 of the Basic Law, the Chancellor determines the general guidelines of policy (Richtlinienkompetenz), while each minister runs his or her department independently within those guidelines. In foreign and security policy that produces a division of labour that is clear on paper and contested in practice.

Who has held the office

Fact For most of the Federal Republic's history the Foreign Office has gone to the smaller party in a coalition. The CDU held it only in the early years: Konrad Adenauer combined it with the chancellorship from 1951 to 1955, followed by Heinrich von Brentano (1955–1961) and Gerhard Schröder (1961–1966) — a CDU politician not to be confused with the later SPD Chancellor of the same name. Wadephul is the first CDU foreign minister since Schröder left office in 1966.

1. 1951–1966

   CDU

   Adenauer, von Brentano, Schröder — the era of Westbindung, NATO membership and the Elysée Treaty.

2. 1966–1969

   SPD

   Willy Brandt in the first grand coalition; the beginnings of the new Ostpolitik.

3. 1969–1998

   FDP

   Walter Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1974–1992, with a brief interruption in 1982) and Klaus Kinkel — détente, reunification and the early post-Cold War years.

4. 1998–2005

   Greens

   Joschka Fischer — Kosovo, Afghanistan and the refusal to join the Iraq war.

5. 2005–2021

   SPD and FDP

   Frank-Walter Steinmeier (twice), Guido Westerwelle, Sigmar Gabriel and Heiko Maas.

6. 2021–2025

   Greens

   Annalena Baerbock, during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Zeitenwende.

7. Since 2025

   CDU

   Johann Wadephul in the Merz cabinet — Chancellor and Foreign Minister from the same party for the first time since the 1960s.

Strategic challenges

Analysis Four challenges dominate German foreign policy in 2026. First, Russia: a war in Ukraine with no settlement in sight, and, according to the German government, Russian sabotage and attempted attacks on German soil, such as the Leipzig case announced in September 2026. Second, the United States: an ally whose commitment to Europe can no longer be taken for granted, as the Greenland dispute of January 2026 made plain. Third, China: Germany's largest trading partner in goods for much of the past decade and, in Wadephul's 2023 phrase, "the central epochal challenge of the 21st century". Fourth, the Middle East, where Germany's commitment to Israel's security, its support for international humanitarian law and its interest in regional stability must be balanced — a tension that came to a head during the Gaza war and the 2026 Iran war.

China illustrates how the tradition is being revised. For much of the 2000s and 2010s German policy towards Beijing followed a logic similar to the late Ostpolitik towards Moscow: deep trade ties, regular government consultations and the hope that integration into the world economy would moderate China's behaviour — often summarised as Wandel durch Handel, change through trade. The government's China strategy of 2023 recast China as "partner, competitor and systemic rival" and called for reducing risky dependencies. In the Bundestag debate on that strategy, Wadephul, then in opposition, accused the governing coalition of "ideological blinders" while himself describing China's rise in stark terms. As minister he has combined direct criticism — over Taiwan and the South China Sea — with a willingness to travel to Beijing, but only, as the postponement of his October 2025 trip showed, on terms Berlin considered adequate.

A fifth, less visible challenge is standing in the wider world. Germany's first-ever defeat in a UN Security Council election, on 3 June 2026, showed that its positions are not shared by many states in the Global South. Wadephul's travel to India, Indonesia, South Africa and North Africa can be read as an attempt to respond to that.

Wadephul's documented positions vs. government policy

This final section separates what Wadephul has said himself from what the German government has decided. As Foreign Minister he is bound by cabinet decisions and the Chancellor's guidelines; his own statements nonetheless sometimes ran ahead of, or diverged from, the line eventually taken. Only documented positions are included.

Personal positions and government decisions compared

Issue	Wadephul's documented position	Government policy	Assessment
NATO spending	Backed 5% of GDP in Antalya, 15 May 2025: “Wir folgen ihm da.”	Coalition had agreed not to name a figure before the summit; NATO adopted 5% at The Hague, June 2025	Analysis Ran ahead of the coalition; outcome matched his position
Israel arms exports	May 2025: further exports subject to review of compliance with humanitarian law; rejected “forced solidarity”	Chancellor halted exports usable in Gaza, 8 Aug 2025; lifted from 24 Nov 2025	Analysis His remarks preceded the Chancellor's decision, which he then defended
Palestinian state	Jun 2025: recognition now “the wrong signal”; Jul 2025: end of a process that “must begin now”	No recognition documented in our sources	Analysis Consistent with government line, with shifting emphasis
Syrian returns	Oct 2025: returns only very limitedly possible in the short term	Returns policy unchanged; Chancellor backed him personally	Analysis Open divergence in tone from parts of the CDU/CSU
Iran war 2026	“Germany is not participating in this war.”	Non-participation; no involvement in regime change	Analysis Aligned
Russia contacts	Sought meeting with Lavrov, Sep 2026: “you have to negotiate with opponents”	Hard line after Leipzig: consulate closed, EU sanctions proposed	Analysis Dialogue alongside pressure, not instead of it

For the full record of these episodes see controversies and political positions; for his record in office, foreign policy.